Bodily Awareness
In this project I articulate and defend a relational theory of bodily awareness. According to this theory, bodily experiences are centrally constituted by a psychological relation between the subject and (parts of) her body.
The relational theory is an alternative to the representational theory, the current orthodox view of bodily awareness (O’Shaughnessy 1980, 1995; Tye 1995; Bermúdez 1998; Bain 2003; de Vignemont 2018). On this view, bodily experiences are mental states that have truth-evaluable intentional contents. So tactile sensations, for example, are mental states that represent pressure on the skin. This theory is motivated in the literature by two considerations. First, it is held to provide a straightforward account of bodily illusions in terms of misrepresentation. And second, its proponents claim it is mandated by the spatial properties—including the structure of the body as an integrated whole—discernible in bodily experience.
As I argue, however, the relational theory is superior to the representational theory. Bodily experiences have phenomenal character: there is something it’s like to feel a tap on one’s elbow or feel one’s arm move. Where the representational view struggles to explain such character, it is readily understood by the relational theory as constituted by the body itself, its properties, and its movement.
Furthermore, the standard arguments in favour of representationalism—the arguments from bodily illusion and from the spatial character of bodily experience—are not in fact compelling. My paper ‘Bodily Illusions and Representationalism’ argues that no would-be case of bodily illusion is one in which the body appears to be F, but is not in fact F. Such cases therefore offer no support for the representational theory. In a second paper, ‘The Puzzle of Proprioception’ I challenge the representationalist’s assumption that we are aware in bodily experience of the structural configuration of our bodies and the relative location of body parts. In future work I will focus on the phenomenal character of bodily experience to further articulate and motivate the relational theory.
Perception of space and spatial properties
My second project concerns perception, and in particular our perception of space and the spatial properties of objects. I argue that we enjoy a multisensory representation of space. This multisensory representation of space is required to explain our awareness of the spatial relations between objects.
We conceive of the world we perceive as objective. Central to our so conceiving of it, is that the things we are aware of through different senses seem to us nonetheless to occupy a single space (Eilan 1993). But the spatial structure of perceptual experience differs across the senses. In vision, we experience a region of space. When we are visually aware of two spatially related things, we have a visual experience of the space that separates them (Martin 1992, 1993). The same is not true of audition (Nudds 2009) or touch (Martin 1992). Our awareness of things we see, hear and touch as spatially related cannot be explained by their seeming to occupy a single space in experience. So what then does our awareness of the spatial relations between objects of different senses consist in?
I recently co-authored a book chapter with Matthew Nudds on this question, and I have a paper in progress that draws on empirical evidence to argue for the existence of a multisensory ‘map’ or representation of space. This multisensory representation of space is informed by perception, but is not the content of any perceptual experience.
In this project I articulate and defend a relational theory of bodily awareness. According to this theory, bodily experiences are centrally constituted by a psychological relation between the subject and (parts of) her body.
The relational theory is an alternative to the representational theory, the current orthodox view of bodily awareness (O’Shaughnessy 1980, 1995; Tye 1995; Bermúdez 1998; Bain 2003; de Vignemont 2018). On this view, bodily experiences are mental states that have truth-evaluable intentional contents. So tactile sensations, for example, are mental states that represent pressure on the skin. This theory is motivated in the literature by two considerations. First, it is held to provide a straightforward account of bodily illusions in terms of misrepresentation. And second, its proponents claim it is mandated by the spatial properties—including the structure of the body as an integrated whole—discernible in bodily experience.
As I argue, however, the relational theory is superior to the representational theory. Bodily experiences have phenomenal character: there is something it’s like to feel a tap on one’s elbow or feel one’s arm move. Where the representational view struggles to explain such character, it is readily understood by the relational theory as constituted by the body itself, its properties, and its movement.
Furthermore, the standard arguments in favour of representationalism—the arguments from bodily illusion and from the spatial character of bodily experience—are not in fact compelling. My paper ‘Bodily Illusions and Representationalism’ argues that no would-be case of bodily illusion is one in which the body appears to be F, but is not in fact F. Such cases therefore offer no support for the representational theory. In a second paper, ‘The Puzzle of Proprioception’ I challenge the representationalist’s assumption that we are aware in bodily experience of the structural configuration of our bodies and the relative location of body parts. In future work I will focus on the phenomenal character of bodily experience to further articulate and motivate the relational theory.
Perception of space and spatial properties
My second project concerns perception, and in particular our perception of space and the spatial properties of objects. I argue that we enjoy a multisensory representation of space. This multisensory representation of space is required to explain our awareness of the spatial relations between objects.
We conceive of the world we perceive as objective. Central to our so conceiving of it, is that the things we are aware of through different senses seem to us nonetheless to occupy a single space (Eilan 1993). But the spatial structure of perceptual experience differs across the senses. In vision, we experience a region of space. When we are visually aware of two spatially related things, we have a visual experience of the space that separates them (Martin 1992, 1993). The same is not true of audition (Nudds 2009) or touch (Martin 1992). Our awareness of things we see, hear and touch as spatially related cannot be explained by their seeming to occupy a single space in experience. So what then does our awareness of the spatial relations between objects of different senses consist in?
I recently co-authored a book chapter with Matthew Nudds on this question, and I have a paper in progress that draws on empirical evidence to argue for the existence of a multisensory ‘map’ or representation of space. This multisensory representation of space is informed by perception, but is not the content of any perceptual experience.
